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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO LAW AND ECONOMICS?
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
One way to celebrate Guido Calabresi and his Costs of Accidents' is
to remember some carping about the field they helped create. Carp-
ers speak from many corners of the law school curriculum. In recog-
nition of The Costs of Accidents as a torts classic, we can start with torts.
"Every fresh contribution to the economic analysis of tort law," wrote
Ernest Weinrib in 1989, "adds a new storey to an edifice whose bottom
has long since disappeared into the sand."2
With these words, Professor Weinrib added a storey of his own to
another edifice; his remark joined an array of criticisms that declared
law and economics to be dead, futile, or spent. In the salad days of
this academic movement, for instance, Morton Horwitz used a Hofstra
Law Review symposium on efficiency to say that law and economics
had "'peaked out' as the latest fad in legal scholarship."' Then came
Leonard Jaffee, twelve years later in the same journal: "So, I have two
big gripes against Law and Economics. One is that it's sick and
spreads sickness. The other's that it doesn't work in ways it claims, or
do what it pretends."4 Duncan Kennedy called efficiency, a central
* Sam Nunn Professor of Law, Emory University. Thanks to Jami Hodo for research
assistance, and to the faculties of Indiana (Indianapolis) and Rutgers (Newark) law schools
for feedback at workshops. The usual disclaimer absolving helpers from responsibility for
errors may need amplification here: to write about law and economics, I needed to consult
with colleagues whose greater familiarity with the subject has led them to contrary conclu-
sions. For collegial disagreement and gracious tutelage, I thank Tom Ulen; for good ideas
and helpful comments on a draft, Robert Ahdieh, Robert Blecker, Bill Carney, Dan Cole,
and Paco Guerra; and for planting a seed two years ago, by asking me casually where I
stood on law and economics, Jill Fisch. Ijoin the applause for Don Gifford and the Univer-
sity of Maryland School of Law faculty, students, and staff, who made the Symposium week-
end so stimulating and enjoyable. Honoring Judge Calabresi was an honor: long may
Guido enjoy renewed celebrations of his book.
1. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS].
2. ErnestJ. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. Riv. 485, 487 (1989).
3. MortonJ. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics ?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 905
(1980). Nine years later, Owen Fiss agreed that law and economics had "peaked." Owen
M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 245 (1989).
4. Leonard R. Jaffee, The Troubles with Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 777, 779
(1992). To which Judge Posner replied that at first glance he thoughtJaffee's article "was
either a spoof or the product of a deranged mind." Richard A. Posner, The Strangest Attack
Yet on Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 933, 933 (1992).
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tenet of law and economics, "incoherent" and likely to remain alive
only because of the "enormous apologetic usefulness" it offered.5 Ac-
cording to David Gray Carlson, "[t] here are two types of law-and-eco-
nomics: one that is dubious and another that is dubious in the
extreme."6 In her 2004 book, The Triumph of Venus,7 Jeanne Schroe-
der, who'd majored in economics in college, declared that "most law-
and-economic proposals are classic cases of GIGO (garbage in-gar-
bage out): nonfalsified theories are applied to untested assumptions
in order to produce nonverifiable conclusions. Law-and-economics
has all the characteristics of a cult.
'
"
8
These attacks arrayed in the background, I make here a some-
what different claim: that law and economics is no longer amenable to
critique.9 This movement, in my view, is not an edifice whose bottom
has disappeared into the sand. Instead it is not an edifice at all. In
past decades, it did take shape as a unique structure; the Chicago
School bore distinctive characteristics.1 0 A scholar generating new
work in law and economics during this "edifice" era would borrow
precepts from neoclassical economics and apply them to the law, in an
effort either to describe, in material terms, how law affects and re-
sponds to aggregations of human beings ("positive" law and econom-
ics) or to propose measures designed to improve these consequences
("normative" or "prescriptive" law and economics).11 Many practi-
tioners, Richard Posner foremost among them, dealt in both descrip-
5. Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 388, 445 (1981) [hereinafter Critique].
6. David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 577, 614 (1989).
7. JEANNE LORRAINE SCHROEDER, THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET
(2004).
8. Id. at 2.
9. In this contention I agree in part with Nicholas Mercuro and Steven Medema, who
argue that "[l]egitimate critiques of Law and Economics can only come from comparing
competitive methodologies or approaches." NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAw: FROM POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM 175 (1997). No competitive
methodologies or approaches exist, I argue here, now that law and economics has diffused
and disintegrated. Or, to paraphrase Mercuro and Medema: Law and economics can be
critiqued only to the extent that it can be compared to competitive methodologies or ap-
proaches. Id.
10. See id. at 51-83 (describing the Chicago School).
11. See Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD.
L. REv. 85 (2005) (comparing positive and normative law and economics). Writers raise
questions about these labels. See, e.g., ChristineJolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1474-75 (1998) (distinguishing "prescriptive" from "nor-
mative" on the ground that the latter is broader). I hope to move along here without
getting bogged down.
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tion and prescription. The combination brought to law the most
philosophical strand in microeconomic theory, welfare economics.
12
Today the Chicago edifice shares attention with other types of law
and economics. Anyone reading this far has undoubtedly heard that
law and economics contains multitudes-an array of literatures, sub-
movements, and schools of thought.1 3 Perhaps it does. Certainly a
scholar trained in both economics and law has the vocabulary to com-
bine the two disciplines in ways that would not hew to the descriptions
of Chicago-style welfare economics, or to any other fraction of the
genre. But observers with no stake in the clich6 about diversity can
see how well it serves insiders, who get from it a basis to say that their
movement is big and a ready retort to semi-disavow anything in it that
provokes criticism: "Well, that's one of the other schools."1 4 Law and
economics can claim pluralism when pluralism suits, monolithic unity
when pluralism threatens to splinter its power.
15
This inclination within the movement to have it both ways impels
me to take a second look at its premise that law and economics is
distinct from all other disciplines yet eclectic and pluralistic, the acad-
emy's big tent. The two postures are not only in tension with each
other but perhaps also, I start to suspect, questionable in isolation.
For law and economics to be valid, two conditions must obtain: Law
and economics needs a foundation of meaningful concepts and a
12. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw AND ECONOMICS 43 (3d ed. 2000)
(describing welfare economics as "much more ... philosophical than the other topics in
microeconomic theory" and defining it as the study of "how the decisions of many individ-
uals and firms interact to affect the well-being of individuals").
13. See Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAw &
Soc'v REV. 157, 158 n.4 (2000) (noting a reviewer's reproach to Etzioni that there is "no
single law and economic paradigm"). For iterations of the familiar "I am large, I contain
multitudes" claim, see David Friedman, Law and Economics, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 144 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1998) (noting that law and eco-
nomics "involves three distinct but related enterprises"); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Effi-
ciency, and Insider Trading. Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 Nw.
U. L. REV. 443, 481 (2001) (stating that "there is no single 'economic theory'"); Fred S.
McChesney, Purchasing Political Inaction: How Regulators Use the Threat of Legal "Reform" to
Extort Payoffs, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'V 211, 211 (1997) (describing law and economics as
a mansion with many rooms").
14. A section of Harvard Law School's website called The Bridge, which provides an
overview of law and economics, cautions that those who seek to understand critics' objec-
tions to this "most controversial of the methodologies currently employed in legal scholar-
ship and legal education" must "keep in mind that there are many varieties of economic
analysis," and that "[c]riticisms that bear directly upon one variety are often irrelevant to
the others." Criticisms of Economic Analysis-and Responses Thereto, in THE BRIDGE, at http://
cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/LawEconomics/critique.txt.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2004)
[hereinafter Harvard Statement].
15. As economist Jack Hirshleifer said, in italics, "There is only one social science." Jack
Hirshleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AM. ECON. Rv. 53, 53 (1985).
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boundary to fence out what it rejects or does not believe. If these two
elements are missing, then its distinctive aspects may be unsound and
its variations, offshoots, and alliances may be incoherent. In this Arti-
cle I explore this question of foundations under, and boundaries
around, the movement.
Following the lead of our Symposium, which looks at "a genera-
tion" that runs from 1970 to 2005, my rhetorical question, Whatever
Happened... ? broaches an argument that although a generation ago
law and economics stood-as an edifice, if you like-it no longer en-
dures. The movement was done in by a blend of some claims that
were wrong with other claims that came across in legal circles as too
right-and also too trivial-to reject. Law and economics combined
too little accuracy with too much: While ill founded, dubious, or tau-
tological premises were eroding its credibility, other notions from the
movement, consistent with what diverse thinkers and audiences be-
lieved, blurred the line between law and economics on one hand and
everything else in jurisprudence on the other. Withdraw the mistakes
and exaggerations from law and economics and what you get is either
"positive" scholarship declaring five to be the sum of three and two or
some indistinguishable share of the centrist, forward-looking, quasi-
utilitarian melange of advice to policy-minded lawyers that now domi-
nates the legal academy, unconfined to any sector.
During the last decade, members of the movement labored to
stop the fall. Unable to do much about errors, they worked on the
second front, the crisis of too much acceptance, mainly by trying to
claim successful outsider movements as their own, rather than react-
ing to them as threats or challenges. When psychology dealt blows to
the ideal of a rational actor, for instance, economic analysts invoked
the label of "behavioral economics" to describe claims that were di-
rectly contrary to neoclassical dogma.16 Led by Robert Ellickson, they
16. See Carlson, supra note 6, at 614. Among scholars, an affinity for behavioral eco-
nomics obstructs faith in strong forms of Chicago doctrine but generally does not lead to
full repudiation of law and economics; those with these mixed feelings favor the flexible
adjective "bounded":
[P]eople's decisionmaking commonly exhibits "bounded rationality," in that they
can only process a finite amount of information and thus must rely on "rules of
thumb" to make decisions; "bounded willpower," in that they sometimes do
things that are not in their long-term self-interest; and "bounded self-interest," in
that they care about other people and whether the treatment they receive is recip-
rocally "fair."
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Pittsburgh, City of Bridges: Developing a Rational Approach to Interdisci-
plinary Discourse on Law, 38 LAw & Soc'y REv. 199, 202 (2004) (citing Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law
and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000)). Posner argues that these three "bounded[s]"
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used the word "norms" to summarize phenomena inconvenient to the
edifice.17 This capacious label not only could obscure what did not fit
the neoclassical model, but also aid a contention that human behav-
iors deviating from the paradigm-behaviors that reveal altruism, ex-
penditures that appear to waste rather than accrete money, refusals to
cheat or defect in games, and the like-are consistent with law and
economics, rather than refutations of its core premises. This coopta-
tion strategy reached a height in 2002 with the publication of Fairness
Versus Welfare,a8 a book from two scholars identified with the law and
economics movement who declared victory by asserting that "welfare"
accounted for everything that jurisprudence pursues, except for a
handful of silly vestigial claims which the authors disparaged as "fair-
ness." 9 This putative victory, however, would be better described as
submergence into a larger whole. Part of the law and economics edi-
fice has disappeared into the sand; part has joined the sand itself.
So much for Weinrib's edifice; Jeanne Schroeder had a different
one-word critique. Schroeder called law and economics a "cult" in
order to rebuke it for falling short of scientific standards.2 ° Yet cults
are characterized by more than just clinging to a dogma that gets real-
ity wrong. They are social groups. 21 They contain members who dis-
dain nonmembers, and who have been known to enjoy thinking that
outsiders feel hostility towards them.2 2 I quote Schroeder's insult with
approval-even though one might debate her charges of falsity-as a
concise description of a movement done in by the twin stabbings of
excessive inaccuracy and trivial accuracy. Stripped of its distinctive in-
tellectual features, no longer able to give descriptions or policy recom-
mendations that could not have come from sources outside the
misleadingly make behavioral economics look as if it has "a unified framework of analysis."
Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1555 (1998) [hereinafter Rational Choice].
17. See Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27J. LEGAL STUD.
537, 546-49 (1998) (discussing various attempts to incorporate norms theory into law and
economics).
18. Louis KAPLOW & STEPHEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002).
19. See id. at xvii ("Our thesis is that social decisions should be based exclusively on their
effects on the welfare of individuals-and, accordingly, should not depend on notions of
fairness, justice or cognate concepts.").
20. Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REv.
147, 150 (2000).
21. Doni Whitsett & Stephen A. Kent, Cults and Families, 84 FAM. IN SoC'v: J. CONTEMP.
Hum. SERVS. 491, 499 (2003).
22. See id. at 496 ("Cults divide the world into discrete, dichotomous categories: good
and evil, the saved and the damned, winners and losers, and so on. These divisions re-
present splitting, which is a primitive defense mechanism that reduces the anxiety of having
to live with life's uncertainties." (citation omitted)).
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movement, law and economics now functions mainly as a faculty club
with opaque, arbitrary criteria for membership.
Where do The Costs of Accidents and Guido Calabresi fit in this
picture? Away from the missteps. Calabresi's book, in contrast to the
one by Kaplow and Shavell, focuses on welfare without perceiving it as
a prizefighter that has beaten or should beat a straw man, hapless fair-
ness. It draws readers in with its clarity and reason, never trying to
exclude or intimidate anyone. It is a model, indeed, of what law and
economics scholarship can contribute in the eras following refutation
of its core tenets: a wide social science that invites participants to con-
sider the common good.
I. ERRoRs: WHAT HAS CRUMBLED, WHAT HAs NEVER BEEN
Consider how the tenets and distinguishing features of law and
economics are faring at the thirty-fifth anniversary of The Costs of
Accidents.
A. Three Precepts
1. Rational Choice.-On the first page of Economic Analysis of
Law,23 Richard Posner declared a first axiom: "man is a rational maxi-
mizer of his ends in life."2 4 This individual knows what he wants and
chooses means to reach his goals. The world through economists'
eyes begins here, at the point where an individual makes a choice
among alternatives. Rational choice is the "first and most basic" of
"the critical early moves" in law and economics.25 Only if individuals
can know what they want and act instrumentally on their desires can
the other central precepts of the discipline-among them prefer-
ences, opportunities, and a consciousness of scarcity-make sense.
Moreover, Posner continues:
[T]he concept of rationality used by the economist is objec-
tive rather than subjective, so that it would not be a solecism
to speak of a rational frog. Rationality means little more to
an economist than a disposition to choose, consciously or
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 1 (1972).
24. The current edition has the phrase on page 3, its first page of text. RicHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter ECONOMIC ANALYsis].
Citations below are to the current edition.
25. Arthur Allen Left, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REv. 451, 456 (1974).
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unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the chooser
happens to have.
26
According to this construction of rationality, the chooser will not lose
the designation of "rational" just because her choices are self-destruc-
tive, perverse, opaque, inconsistent, unstable over time, resistant to
Arrovian ordinal ranking, or dependent on the unpredictable choices
that others make. Her choices can even defy the downward-sloping
demand curve. As Arthur Leff noted decades ago, when
a society dentist raises his prices and thereby increases his
gross volume of business, it is no violation of the principle of
the inverse relation between price and quantity. It only
proves that buyers now perceive that they are buying some-
thing else which they now value more highly, "society den-
tistry," say, rather than "mere" dentistry.27
Because "whatever ends the chooser happens to have" emerge from
her behavior rather than from her own testimony or other expression,
any means in this "objective" sense can be "apt."
One critique of Chicago-style law and economics argues that ra-
tional choice according to this school remains vulnerable to chal-
lenges that philosophy has long been expressing, perhaps "since the
fourth century B.C." 2' For openers, explains philosopher and classics
scholar Martha Nussbaum, law and economics regards preferences as
"exogenous, i.e., not significantly shaped by laws and institutions,"
whereas "the endogeneity of preferences has been recognized by al-
most all the major writers on emotion and desire in the history of
Western philosophy. '29 To speak of choice as if it originated entirely
inside the actor is simply wrong. Furthermore, individuals do not sim-
ply make choices: they value their power to do so."° People "do not
typically view as equivalent two states of the world, one produced by
their own agency and the other not." 1 Ends, which law and econom-
ics sees as fixed, actually vary over time and through discourse; human
beings deliberate about them.12 The concept of "preferences" slop-
pily throws together what philosophers have kept separated as five dis-
26. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 17.
27. Leff, supra note 25, at 457-58.
28. Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of (a Particular
Type oJ) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. Rav. 1197, 1197 (1997).
29. Id. at 1197-98.
30. Id. at 1204.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1207-08.
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tinct phenomena: "belief, desire, perception, appetite, and
emotion."
3 13
Along with old writings that cast the economists' version of ra-
tional choice into question, newer ones have refuted this concept
through experimentation and revision. The neoclassical conception
of rationality had fancied that human beings make choices within "a
preference ordering that is complete and transitive, subject to perfect
and costlessly acquired information."34 Reality began to sully the pre-
mise. In the mid-twentieth century Herbert Simon established a
beachhead for empiricism in economics with his identification of
"bounded rationality," whereby a subject makes the best choices she
can, given her limited "knowledge and computational capacities and
skills."35  Simon's work brought about behavioral economics, the
branch of microeconomics that focuses on the choices individuals
make rather than the processes of their decisionmaking.36 "Choice,"
manifested in behaviors rather than the trail of conscious strategy that
precedes them, came to subsume "rational": If some actor did it, then
we'll say she made a choice in pursuit of her own ends.
As Jeanne Schroeder has argued, this outcome cannot sit well in
law and economics because of how much it gives away.37 Schroeder
recounts Posner's distressed response 38 to the leading law review arti-
cle on behavioral economics, Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler's A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics.39 Posner "assumes that adding an ac-
count of 'non-rationality' in market relations would be tantamount to
abandoning theory entirely in favor of a mere all-inclusive description
of empirical behavior lacking any explanatory or predictive power."40
33. Id. at 1209. Nussbaum adds that these five exist "at the very least." Id.
34. MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS OR How ECONOMISTS EXPLAIN 229
(2d ed. 1992).
35. Schroeder, supra note 20, at 165 (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, AN EMPIRICALLY
BASED MICROECONOMICS 18 (1997)).
36. Although much work in law and economics concedes that behavioral economics
has supplanted or significantly modified the old paradigm of rational choice, some dis-
agree. See Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics'Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded
for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 73-74 (2002)
("Whereas law and economics assumes too much rationality on the part of legal actors as
an empirical matter, behavioral law and economics errs by assuming too much
irrationality.").
37. See Schroeder, supra note 20, at 169 ("[I]t is a standard critique of neo-classical
theory that to so expand the definition of economic preferences is to rob the theory of all
explanatory and predictive power .... ").
38. Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 16.
39. Jolls et al., supra note 11.
40. Schroeder, supra note 20, at 155 (citing Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 16, at
1552).
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He concludes that "behavioral economics merely describes human ac-
tions [and does a poorjob of doing so] but has no theory of action."41
In response to Posner, Schroeder offers psychoanalytic theory as an
alternative account for the manifestations of human choice that can-
not be wedged into either the neoclassical construct of strategic, util-
ity-maximizing decisionmaking on one hand, or the blank catchall of
random, arbitrary behavior on the other.42
Whether or not one accepts Schroeder's alternative, the dilemma
for law and economics is clear. Neoclassical assertions of rationality-
abstract, laboratory-crystalline, severed from ordinary experience-
stray too far from empirical fact to explain or predict much. Posner's
"rational frog" expresses this limitation succinctly: We believe the frog
pursues her own ends, but we have nothing but her behavior to look
at when we seek support for that belief. To the extent that economic
analysts accept variety in human behavior, especially behavior that de-
fies well-ordered pursuit of transparent ends, they became less able to
explain and predict because they have conceded that human behavior
is either random or, alternatively, obedient to some logic alien to the
rational-actor model, and thus beyond their ken.43
Economic analysts regret this defeat and hope they can undo it.
"Deviations from the rational-actor assumption can and should be in-
corporated into economic analysis," declares the Harvard law and eco-
nomics website.44 The cooptation strategy cannot, however, readily
accommodate material so contrary to a first principle of economic
analysis.
2. Efficiency vs. Wealth Maximization vs. Welfare.-What do, or
should, individuals or societies or legal systems choose to pursue? Ec-
onomic analysts have shuttled between terms to describe the goal.
Two leading contenders have been "efficiency" (or sometimes "alloca-
tive efficiency") and "wealth maximization." A third term, "welfare,"
has arisen more recently. None is stable.
Begin with the earlier terms. Among pursuits with philosophical
implications, both "efficiency" and "wealth maximization" line up at a
utilitarian side of the standard divide between a deontological, or
41. Id. (citing Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 16, at 1558-59).
42. Id.
43. For another attempt to help law and economics by adding other logics, supple-
menting Schroeder's suggestion of Lacanian philosophy, see Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw.
U. L. REv. 1141 (2001) (proposing "time-shifted rationality," a version of rational choice
suited to humanity thousands of years ago).
44. Harvard Statement, supra note 14.
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Kantian, approach at one end and utilitarianism at the other; but the
two have different meanings, at least for economic analysts. Richard
Posner distinguished them in a 1979 paper, published shortly before
his move to the federal bench. In Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal
Theory,45 Posner associated "efficiency" with utilitarianism and "wealth
maximization" with law and economics, insisting that the two were not
synonymous.46
If "efficiency" stands in for utilitarianism, Posner argued, then
"efficiency" is inferior to "wealth maximization" as a description of
what individuals and societies pursue, or should be understood as pur-
suing.4 7 Utilitarianism, in Posner's rendering, seeks a "surplus of plea-
sure over pain,"4 but gives its followers no guidance as to whose
pleasure counts (are animals included?), no distinction between aver-
age and total happiness, and no metric to evaluate success and fail-
ure.49 Wealth maximization as an alternative ideal avoids these
difficulties by insisting on "value in dollars or dollar equivalents."50 In
Posner's summation: "The only kind of preference that counts in a
system of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by
money-in other words, that is registered in a market."51
This solution, rooted in the philosophical case against utilitarian-
ism, has proved to be no improvement over the old morass associated
with using efficiency as the goal of policymaking. Installing precision
in place of vagueness, it brought in difficulties of its own. First, as
Morton Horwitz was quick to say in attacking law and economics on
behalf of critical legal studies-at the time, 1980, a plausible competi-
tor in the legal academy-the new embrace of wealth maximization
meant that "the ground of debate [had shifted] to social theory."5 2 As
soon as law and economics declares that it is good to maximize wealth,
the holders of wealth achieve new ascendancy, a pride of place un-
available to them in the old utilitarian days when efficiency covered
and obscured too much for them to enjoy overt privilege. "For a long
time, efficiency has been used in the economic analysis as if it were an
independent concept, not entirely relative to whatever distribution of
45. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979).
46. Id at 111-35.
47. Id. at 119-24.
48. Id. at 104.
49. Id. at 112-13.
50. Id. at 119.
51. Id.
52. Horwitz, supra note 3, at 905.
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wealth existed," Horwitz concluded. 3 "And once it has been realized
that efficiency is, by definition, a function of a particular distribution
(invariably the status quo), the inherently conservative bias of the defi-
nition of efficiency becomes clear."
5 4
In the same law review symposium, 5 Jules Coleman offered a
more nuanced criticism of the move from efficiency to wealth max-
imization. 51 "Efficiency," or any similar term that locates value be-
yond money, has the virtue of recognizing that individuals want more
than to accrete wealthY.5  They must feel that way, given the nature of
money: "Because wealth is not something of intrinsic value, its claim
to moral worth depends on its extrinsic value, that is, on its capacity to
secure other things of value."58 A broader, if vaguer, desideratum like
"happiness" or "well-being"-something inherently good to have and
an end in itself-would capture more accurately what people want
and pursue.
Coleman also drives the wealth-maximization thesis to a pressure
point when he notes that inherently it counsels policymakers to foster
scarcity-to make more of it, rather than less-contrary to the neo-
classical view of scarcity as a condition against which human actors
struggle.59 Wealth maximization requires prices: simple barter does
not create new wealth. When you and I trade my orange for your
apple, neither of us has attained wealth thereby.' Only in the context
of price can one speak of wealth.61 And price does not exist unless
desired commodities are scarce.62 Accordingly, an advocate of wealth
maximization as the criterion of policymaking must oppose the aboli-
tion, or perhaps even the amelioration, of scarcity.6"
53. Id. at 911.
54. Id. at 911-12.
55. Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980).
56. Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
520-26 (1980).
57. Id. at 528.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 524.
60. Id. at 523.
61. Id. Economists may disagree with Coleman on this point:
Not true: barter, just like exchange using money, improves welfare. The swap of
an orange for an apple must, by hypothesis, make each of us better off or we
wouldn't do it. I like to eat apples more than I like to eat oranges. If you feel the
opposite way, we're both better off (more units of utility) if you swap your apple
for my orange.
Memorandum from William J. Carney, Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law,
to Anita Bernstein 3-4 (May 14, 2004) (on file with author).
62. Coleman, supra note 56, at 524.
63. Id.
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The reliance on prices adds other complications to the wealth-
maximization criterion. For openers, what about the barter point just
mentioned? I am happier with my new apple and you are happier
with your new orange-one might recall Vilfredo Pareto here6 4-but
wealth maximization is indifferent to this surge in aggregate satisfac-
tion. Price is a function of demand, and demand will vary in response
to preexisting distributions of wealth.6" It is thus idle-or instead po-
litically significant, as Horwitz said 66-to contemplate wealth max-
imization without attention to how much wealth each maximizer
already has.67 With a dollar the only metric and with the marginal
utility of money a sure fact, wealth maximization "has the result of
weighting the preferences of wealthy persons more heavily than the
preferences of poorer persons"6-that is, the rich get extra ballots in
the form of dollars they don't need to save. Tant pis for wealth
maximization.69
Following this critique of the wealth-maximization criterion, "wel-
fare" has arisen as a kind of successor to the old precursor of "wealth
maximization," "efficiency." Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell have
led the charge among economic analysts to promote this word as sum-
mation of what societies and individuals pursue.7" To many, "welfare"
seems more capacious, perhaps more humanistic, than "efficiency" or
any other word standing in for utilitarianism.71 Yet because it does
not repair what "wealth maximization" once purported to fix-that is,
64. See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 175 (2000) (discussing the "Pareto principle").
65. Coleman, supra note 56, at 526.
66. Horwitz, supra note 3, at 906, 910.
67. Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 470 (Peter Newman ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Palgrave Essay] ("[I]t is hard to take seriously the proposal that the courts
should just apply Kaldor-Hicks and stay out of distributive questions.").
68. Harvard Statement, supra note 14, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/
LawEconomics/critique4.txt.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2004).
69. In commenting on a draft of this Article, Dan Cole noted that
no economist I know (personally or by reputation) treats individuals as Posner
does, as wealth maximizers. Posner took this turn early in his career for two rea-
sons (so far as I can discern): (1) it makes measurement easier (as is always the
case where "the light is better"); and (2) it helped him distinguish economics
from utilitarianism, which was an obsession of his (but no longer seems to be so).
Memorandum from Daniel H. Cole, Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at
Indianapolis, to Anita Bernstein 1-2 (Aug. 27, 2004) (on file with author).
70. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 18 (noting that the concept of "well-
being ... incorporates in a positive way everything that an individual might value").
71. See Chang, supra note 64, at 176 ("Welfarism includes a broader class of moral
theories than utilitarianism, which takes social welfare in a given population to be equal to
the sum of individual utilities.").
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vagueness, indeterminacy, disagreements about measurement-"wel-
fare" carries economic analysts back to their old condition of not be-
ing able to describe what they seek.
72
We see here a dilemma similar to that which haunts the econo-
mists' view of rational choice. The movement can cling to "efficiency"
and remain vulnerable to criticisms about tautology, circularity, vague-
ness, and evasion of pertinent political questions. Alternatively, it can
focus on "wealth maximization," a path that adds misdescription to
the mix and cannot escape similar perils of tautology. Or try "wel-
fare," which in application cannot be distinguished from efficiency
and its perils.
3. Faith in Markets.-Following The Problem of Social Cost,73 both
descriptive and normative strands of law and economics evinced some
enthusiasm for what they called "the market." Coase had recharacter-
ized costs. Whereas earlier thinking, following Pigou, had seen costs
as detriments that one entity imposes on another, to Coase costs were
instead phenomena that obstructed market functions.7 ' The market,
always central in all of microeconomics, took on after Coase even
more fundamental importance to its cousin law and economics. Effi-
ciency, for instance, could be defined as the outcome that a free mar-
ket would produce.7" In this normative sense, the existence of a
market makes efficiency (or wealth maximization) possible.
The normative truism about markets making wealth has not
much occupied law and economics.76 In an alternative, descriptive
sense, however, law and economics has seen markets wherever human
beings deal with one another, including venues far from commercial
transactions. Marriage and family formation take place in markets,
72. Howard Chang notes one problem among many that welfare as a criterion raises:
the term "welfarism," which Amartya Sen defined as the belief that "[t]hejudgment of the
relative goodness of alternative states of affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as
an increasing function of, the respective collections of individual utilities in these states."
Id. at 176 n.6 (quoting Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 468
(1979)). This definition appears to foreclose the version of welfare that Kaplow and
Shavell prefer, which does not equate social welfare with the sum of individual utilities. See
id. at 176 (citing Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between Notions of Fairness and
the Pareto Principle, 1 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 63, 65-66 n.5 (1999)).
73. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
74. Id. at 15-19.
75. Coleman, supra note 56, at 542; Horwitz, supra note 3, at 909.
76. I thank Alan Hyde, Howard Latin, and Tom Ulen for emphasizing this point to me,
each in his own way.
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according to Gary Becker and others.77 Individuals negotiate their
sexual relations as trades.7" Scarce body parts like kidneys, say econo-
mists, could profitably become the objects of regulated exchange.79
The adoption of infants takes place within a market whether we like it
or not, said Posner in the famously career-thwarting paper he wrote
with Elisabeth Landes."° Gestational surrogacy for pay is a service that
American law has long been condoning."1 Crimes, at least the subset
of them that may be deemed "coerced transfers," 2 provoke the wrath
of the state (that is, independent of whether a victim, empowered to
initiate legal redress in tort, chooses to protest) not (only) because
they offend civic morality, but because of their contempt for an or-
derly hypothetical market.8 3 In a recent essay, Claire Hill defends the
faith-in-markets perspective within law and economics, and urges
"skeptics" who don't want to see markets applied to "the personal
sphere" to reconsider their position. 4
Yet even if the market can shed light on the personal sphere, the
law and economics project of identifying unseen markets-in human
bodies and intimate associations and the like-seems to have run its
course. At the risk of signing a death certificate before the patient has
died, and thus compelling myself to lie next to Morton Horwitz and
Owen Fiss,s5 I will venture to say that today the market does not ac-
count for much novelty or centrality in this field, neither its normative
nor its more recent descriptive versions. Coase's masterpiece, always
77. See generally GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981); Lloyd Cohen, Mar-
riage, Divorce and Quasi-Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life", 16J. LEGAL STUD. 267
(1987).
78. See RIlAcRD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON passim (1992).
79. Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures
Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 1 (1989); Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to
the Creation ofa Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1994). Professors Cohen
and Crespi are both Ph.D. economists.
80. Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
81. Laura A. Brill, When Will the Law Catch Up with Technology? Jaycee B. v. Superior
Court of Orange County: An Urgent Cy for Legislation on Gestational Surrogacy, 39 CATH. LAw.
241, 254-55 n.61 (1999).
82. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 215-19 (describing "coerced
transfers").
83. See id. at 218-19 (noting the need to "adjust damages upward" and impose non-
monetary sanctions such as imprisonment, in order to "discourage efforts to bypass the
market").
84. See Claire A. Hill, Law and Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
219, 257 (2004) ("The energy skeptics spend trying to keep the market-even the market-
as-metaphor-out of the personal sphere would be better spent in other ways.").
85. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that each has claimed that law and
economics has peaked).
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amenable to divergent readings, now sounds like a warning that mar-
kets always fail, rather than a promise that exchange will work per-
fectly after the friction of transaction costs has been removed .
6
Accompanying this decline of the market in law and economics
scholarship, a generation of writings skeptical of this institution has
taken critical hold. The most important external criticism of the mar-
ket appears in literature on "incommensurability" and "commodifica-
tion." Work in this genre rejects the market insofar as this artifact
assigns a cash value to anything capable of being transferred from one
possessor to another. The leading scholar in this field identifies her
thesis, first expressed in her title Market-Inalienability,7 as directly hos-
tile to law and economics, whose "methodological archetype" she calls
"universal commodification. " s
Internal criticism of the market is harder to spot because writers
do not present their stance as contrary to the market, or to any other
precept of law and economics. These scholars do not identify them-
selves as antagonists. Yet they do challenge the neoclassical market.
Examples of topics within this internal critique are game theory,
which identifies imperfect information combined with strategic behav-
ior as an obstacle to the negotiation that the parties would prefer;
explorations of conflicts between principals and agents that erode the
possibility of attributing market behaviors to entities like firms; studies
of network effects that conclude by endorsing (admittedly with some
hesitation) state interventions into markets;8 9 and variations on the
theme of the tragedy of the commons, where resources are squan-
dered due to flawed cost internalization.9" "The endowment effect," a
mainstay of behavioral law and economics, denies the central tenet of
a market.91
86. So argues Jeanne Schroeder. Schroeder, supra note 20, at 205.
87. Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
88. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 2 (1996). Cass Sunstein adds that
the notion of incommensurability is a plea for pluralism rather than monism generally,
and so it has in its sights not only law and economics but all thinking that posits a unitary
value. Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 781
(1994).
89. Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S.
CAL. L. REv. 215, 219 (2004); see also Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L.
REv. 1179 (discussing the role of regulation in transactions).
90. This concept comes from another field, biology. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). Economic analysts have adopted it as their own. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms: A Compara-
tive Perspective, 44 ARiz. L. Rev. 593, 605 (2002) (noting that "[e]conomists use the term
'the tragedy of the commons'").
91. Or so I argued in Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations
from Obscenity, Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REv. 305, 311 (1999).
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Adherents of law and economics might find this list-game the-
ory, principal-agent problems, network effects, flawed cost internaliza-
tion and the tragedy of the commons, the endowment effect-
peculiar as an illustration of the collapse of law and economics. "But
this is our material!," they might protest. "These are the problems we
economic analysts have identified. We are working on them-and
frankly we're the only ones working on them." Although I would not
question the sincerity of this hypothetical protest, or the feeling of
kinship implied, it is hard for the prototypical outsider mentioned
earlier-someone who has no stake in this movement's expansive
manifest-destiny ambitions-to agree that any one school of thought
can hold contrary beliefs as simultaneous postulates. Economic ana-
lysts may find it easy to believe that markets work while at the same
time believing that markets don't work: but these contrary views di-
vide the group; they do not unite. If a common interest in markets, or
perhaps a tendency to use market analogies, is sufficient to put X and
Not Xunder the same roof, then mainstream biologists share member-
ship in an evolution-creation movement with creationists, and persons
who choose to abstain from alcohol mingle with persons who choose
to drink heavily when they convene at gatherings of the alcohol move-
ment. Recalling behavioral economics reminds us that law and eco-
nomics likes to expand, or at least keep, its domain by embracing
antithetical developments. And so "market failure" has become al-
most as familiar a phrase in law and economics as "the market" itself.
Same recipe as the one that cooked up "behavioral economics": When
truisms fail, or get refuted, reassert ownership of all material under
question by adding a layer of counter-jargon.
B. The Fall of the Claim to Science
For academic lawyers looking for a movement to join, one appeal
of law and economics is its air of rigor. At least since Langdell, and
with renewed force after legal realism, leaders in the legal academy
have strived to achieve the prestige of science. They still crave, in the
words of critic Morton Horwitz, "a system of legal thought that is ob-jective, neutral, and apolitical."92 This ideal would bring to law what
colleagues elsewhere in a university ostensibly achieve in their labora-
tories: research and discovery in strict fidelity to the laws of nature.93
The claim has fallen.
92. Horwitz, supra note 3, at 905.
93. See Tyler Cowen, Fallacies and Vices, The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 17, 2004), at
http://volokh.com/2004 04 11_volokharchive.html#108224208129980443 ("The Econo-
mist's Vice: 'to think that it is scientific to talk of 'satisfying preferences,' and paternalistic
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1. Predictive Power.-If economics functions within law as a sci-
ence, then it ought to be able to identify which one of several poten-
tial outcomes must follow an antecedent change. The sciences are
characterized by their power to predict. To the extent they cannot
predict, they deviate from science.
Economic analysts diverge on the question of predictive power.
The distinguished socialist economist Joan Robinson, who worked
with Keynes, took a breezy view of her field's pretensions to science:
"It is the business of economists," she once said, "not to tell us what to
do, but to show why what we are doing anyway is in accord with proper
principles."94 Judge Posner has rendered a less blithe assessment. In
his treatise he ascribes predictive powers to economics in general
rather than law and economics in particular:
[One] test of a scientific theory is its predictive power, and
here too economics has had its share of successes, most dra-
matically in recent years. The effects of deregulation, for ex-
ample of the airline industry in the United States, and, more
dramatically, of the communist economies of Central and
Eastern Europe, have had the effects predicted by
economists.95
Because Posner does not say more about this "share of successes" that
had appeared so "dramatically" before his eyes, a reader is hard-
pressed to know what he means. Using "predictive" the way ordinary
speakers of English do-that is, referring to a power to tell the fu-
ture-I am equally hard-pressed to recall any historical occasion of
accurate prediction from this discipline.96 Posner does not even help
us by saying which effects of deregulation economics foresaw, or could
foresee, before they arrived.97 Lower prices for some customers?
or mystical to talk about other normative values.'"). On the futility of the pursuit-of-
science endeavor, see generally Mark V. Tushnet, Law, Science, and Law and Economics, 21
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (1997).
94. See Edward S. Herman, TheEconomics of the Rich, Z MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 1997, avail-
able at http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/hermanjuly 9 7 .htm (cited in Paul H. Brietzke,
New Wrinkles in Law... and Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 105, 126 (1997)).
95. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs, supra note 24, at 18.
96. Claire Hill is more candid, remarking that "the notion that predictions are what are
being sought seems overblown. Often, law and economics accounts are explanations ex
post. It's not common that one can make useful, specific predictions." Hill, supra note 84,
at 256 n.44.
97. Responding to a challenge from philosopher and legal scholar Brian Leiter, Posner
wrote a letter to Leiter in 1996, defending his domain against the charge of inability to
make predictions. Posner did not quite say that economics had in fact predicted anything,
but spoke of "predictions" that "have empirical support":
[A] price ceiling will cause queues, black markets, and quality problems; deregu-
lation results in lower prices and more product variety; communist economies are
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Higher prices for others? New entrants to the market? New moves
toward monopoly? Apparently he uses "predictive" in the peculiar
sense that Joan Robinson lampooned. Instead of predicting in the
sense of foretelling in advance, economic analysis of law-here resem-
bling its sometime companion, evolutionary psychology-makes
highly accurate predictions after events occur: We could have told you
so.!, it proclaims.9" Constitutionalizing the right to abortion begat a
lesser generation of criminals-at least in hindsight, though perhaps
not back in 1973.99 Improvements in welfare came from changes in
legal rules and also came from subsequent changes back to the pre-
changed state:1 0 yes, we could have seen that one coming. 0 '
2. The Testing of Hypotheses.-The criterion of falsifiability (or fal-
sification) expects law and economics, along with anything else that
less productive than capitalist; .. .dirty or dangerous jobs pay more (ceteris
paribus) than clean or safe ones; ... an increase in the severity of punishment will
(ceteris paribus) reduce the amount of crime ... I could go on for hours.
See Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, and Classical Realism, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS
INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 285, 306 (Steven J. Burton ed.,
2000) (quoting Posner's letter). For Leiter's response, see id. at 306-12; Brian Leiter, Is
Economics a "Science"?, Leiter Reports (July 16, 2004), at http://leiterreports.typepad.com/
blog/2004/10/is economics a .html.
Specifics would have presented a mixed record. See, e.g., Richard D. Cudahy, Whither
Deregulation: A Look at the Portents, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 155, 185-86 (2001) (noting
that deregulation of home electricity utilities failed to lower prices in California); Paul
Stephen Dempsey, Taxi Industry Regulation, Deregulation, and Reregulation: The Paradox of
Market Failure, 24 TRANSP. L.J. 73, 114-15 (1996) ("Taxicab deregulation cannot be demon-
strated to have produced . .. the benefits its proponents expected. Prices do not usually
fall, improvements in service are difficult to detect, and ... [t]here is little evidence that
either consumers or producers are better off." (citation omitted)).
98. "20/20 hindsight, masquerading as 20/20 insight," wrote Robert Blecker in his
comments on a draft of this Article. A half-century ago Milton Friedman wrote that this
state of affairs in the discipline was just fine. MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive
Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 9 (1953) ("[T]he 'predictions' by which the
validity of a hypothesis is tested need not be about phenomena that have not yet occurred,
that is, need not be forecasts of future events; they may be about phenomena that have
occurred but observations on which have not yet been made.").
99. John J. Donahue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116
QJ. ECON. 379 (2001).
100. Here I refer to the Scitovsky Paradox. See generally Richard S. Markovits, A Construc-
tive Critique of the Traditional Definition and Use of the Concept of "The Effect of a Choice on
Allocative (Economic) Efficiency " Why the Kaldor-Hicks Test, the Coase Theorem, and Virtually All of
Law-and-Economics Welfare Arguments Are Wrong, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 485, 511-12 (describing
the paradoxical result of a policy being both efficient and inefficient because both the
policy and its reversal pass the Kaldor-Hicks test).
101. Duncan Kennedy makes a related criticism when he notes that Kaldor-Hicks effi-
ciency is a useless criterion for adjudication "in the vast number of cases where there are
two available efficient rules with different distributive consequences." Kennedy, Palgrave
Essay, supra note 67, at 470.
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wants to be called a science, to put forward hypotheses that can be
tested.1 0 2 Law and economics is hardly alone among the sciences in
falling short of this "very severe" ideal. 10 3 Its central precept of ra-
tional choice, however, does land extraordinarily short on the fal-
sifiability scale: Because preferences are inferred from behaviors, all
behaviors become consistent with preferences.10 4 Economist Dierdre
McCloskey, a frequent participant in debates over the relation be-
tween economics and law, notes that one beloved tenet of economics,
the "law of demand,"105 has seldom been tested-and when tested has
been found to be "true for clearheaded rats and false for confused
humans." 1°6 In an article about the falsifiability problem within law
and economics, Gregory Crespi summarizes a dilemma that confronts
anyone who tries to use economic analysis to answer questions about
the law:
If one applies conventional neoclassical economic reasoning
to evaluate proposed legal regimes, one can generally only
respond in one of two ways. One can say that the proposals
are "not Pareto improvements"-a blanket statement that
provides no discrimination among alternatives-and that
they are (or are not) "Kaldor-Hicks improvements"-a
loaded statement that conceals ideological biases and should
be accorded normative significance only by those persons
who embrace the particular and somewhat counter-intuitive
algebra for making interpersonal welfare comparisons inher-
ent in that criterion. As an alternative, one can decline to
offer evaluative judgments of such proposals and simply at-
tempt to predict their likely consequences. Unfortunately,
virtually all explanatory and predictive models are based
upon the standard nonfalsifiable rational behavior postulate.
With such models, it is impossible for one to know whether
the preferences imputed to persons to support a rationality-
102. On Popper-style falsifiability as central to economics, see MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC
THEORY IN RETROSPECr 697 (4th ed. 1985) (noting that for economists, "theories are 'scien-
tific' if they are falsifiable, at least in principle, and not otherwise").
103. Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Con-
fronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 231, 239
(1991) [hereinafter Mid-Life Crisis]. For a stronger criticism of the criterion, see Thomas
M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have "Neutral" Rule 706 Experts, 1998 DET.
C. L. REv. 927, 940 (calling the criterion of falsifiability "discredited").
104. Leff, supra note 25, at 457-58.
105. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 363 (1990) (defining the
law of demand: "a rise in the relative price of a product will, other things held constant,
cause a reduction in the quantity of the product demanded").
106. DIERDRE N. McCLoSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 24-25 (2d ed. 1998).
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based prediction or explanation of past events in fact
exist. 107
Rational choice is not the only tenet of law and economics that
has escaped the rigors of falsification.' 08 Others-for example, the
claim that the common law is efficient-have never been put to this
test.' O9 Still other claims have been refuted. For instance, data con-
tradict public choice theories of behavior, for both voters and offi-
cials. 1 ° Critics of law and economics like to point out that economic
analysts who discover an inefficient legal rule often succumb to temp-
tation and call for a change in the rule, rather than modify their ear-
lier belief in the desirability of pursuing efficiency.11'
3. Coherence.-Another aspect that characterizes science is what
some cover with the word "coherence," or internal consistency.1 2 We
have just considered a few instances of contradictory beliefs within the
movement. 13 Using coherence more loosely as "sticking together,"1' 14
one might also note the longstanding complaint that law and econom-
ics does not hold together in various respects, made particularly with
reference to its inability to settle on either a descriptive or prescriptive
stance. This elderly criticism needs updating, now that law and eco-
nomics has been straying further from coherence.
Soon after-if not as a result of-the manifest failure of its center
to hold, law and economics tried to align itself with fields that had
once been distinctly separate from it. In Overcoming Law,115 for in-
stance, published in 1995, Judge Posner sought to recharacterize law
and economics as a subset of "pragmatism," jettisoning for his pur-
107. Crespi, Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 103, at 243.
108. See, e.g., Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 129, 210
n.294 (2003) (referring to works "arguing that Posner's positive theory of tort law has been
falsified or is non-falsifiable").
109. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REv. 815, 823
(1990).
110. Mark Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"
Practice of the Public Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REv. 199, 214-23 (1988).
111. Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 263, 285 n.132 (1989) (citing Mark Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship,
1980 Wis. L. REV. 1383, 1389).
112. See id. at 270 ("The postulates of a hypothesis must not conflict with one another.").
113. See supra notes 24-91 and accompanying text (discussing rational choice; efficiency,
wealth maximization, and welfare; and markets).
114. In her article on coherence within family law, June Carbone follows this definition,
citing Webster's. June Carbone, The Futility of Coherence: The ALI's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, Compensatory Spousal Payments, 4J.L. & FAM. STUD. 43, 43 n.3 (2002).
115. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw (1995).
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pose more familiar philosophical understandings of this word.116
Some writers have advocated a closer union between law and econom-
ics and evolutionary psychology.1 17 Evolutionary psychology certainly
overlaps with law and economics-both see human beings as strategy-
focused and forward-looking, struggling under conditions of competi-
tion and scarcity; both posit a human actor independent of contexts
like nation and language; both have given social conservatives a
friendly home-but, equally certainly, it differs with law and econom-
ics on basic points."' t Some writers identified with law and economics
see a natural fit between their field and empirical research,119 even
though empirical findings, especially those in behavioral economics,
notoriously interfere with neoclassical precepts a2° The charge that
law and economics is conservative in some stealthy or dishonest way,
eager to protect the holdings of firms and rich people while refusing
to acknowledge its agenda, gets denied ... and lives on. These occa-
sional bedfellows-"pragmatism" reconstituted, evolutionary psychol-
ogy, conservative politics, along with others-have made law and
economics hard to distinguish from other fields, even ones that hold
fundamentally conflicting tenets.
116. I& at 15-21.
117. Jones, supra note 43; Thomas S. Ulen, Evolution, Human Behavior, and Law: A Re-
sponse to Owen Jones's Dunwody Lecture, 53 FLA. L. REv. 931 (2001).
118. Evolutionary psychology seems even more committed than law and economics to
the idea (wrongly associated with Coase) that legislation or legal change is futile as an
instrument of social progress. The two disagree on money versus reproductive fitness as
the primary motive for human action. Law and economics focuses on the present and is
especially weak when it has to explain circumstances that change over time; evolutionary
psychology focuses on the distant past. SeeJones, supra note 43 (describing what behavioral
economics deems not rational as instead rooted in "time-shifted rationality").
119. Notably Tom Ulen. See Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empiri-
cal Work, and the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 875 (arguing for a
new prize for empirical work that bears on law). Since Coase, it is commonplace for eco-
nomic analysts of law to demand more and better empirical effort from economists, or
from scholars of law and economics. E.g., R.H. COASE, THE FirM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAw 19, 28 (1988) (decrying "blackboard economics" for its overpreoccupation with math-
ematics and other abstractions); MERCURO & MEDEMA, supra note 9, at 190 (claiming that
one of the most urgent needs in law and economics is more empirical work). One com-
mentator suggests rather cynically that the call within law and economics "for further 'em-
pirical research' seems to be a call to find more examples and better evidence" of the
prevailing dogma. Robert C. Downs, Law and Economics: Nexus of Science and Belief 27 PAC.
L.J. 1, 35 (1995).
120. For a detailed discussion of conflicts between the rational-actor hypothesis and be-
havioral economics, see Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 16.
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II. WHAT LITTLE REMAINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
Now that rational choice, utilitarianism, efficiency, wealth max-
imization, markets, predictive power, and coherence have been ques-
tioned, abandoned, or smudged beyond recognition, the list of
essential features defining law and economics gets shorter.121 I offer
here all I could come up with: only three items, and even that small
total contains some redundancy.
A. The Policymaker Ascendant
The insightful critic Jeanne Schroeder has noticed something
central to law and economics that seems to have escaped members of
the movement and other observers: "Law and economics is a policy
science," whereas some other sectors of jurisprudence have no desire
to form policy or, as Schroeder puts it, "give advice to the govern-
ment.1 22 Not everyone writing scholarship about the law takes the
perspective of the legislator or a judge. One important contributor,
the "speculative theorist or critical legal scholar," instead focuses on
"the position of the governed-those who are subjected to the law. ' 123
One might also mention the doctrinal writer who works to synthesize
or understand a bounded set of materials like statutes orjudicial opin-
ions.' 24 This policymaker-ascendant approach, then, is not found in-
evitably in legal scholarship.
Despite these few holdouts in the ranks of legal scholars, how-
ever, a focus on the policymaker has had a strong impact on the cur-
riculum, as Martha Chamallas demonstrates by linking the rise of law
and economics with the disappearance of consumers from the law
school curriculum.12 1 Products liability in particular, as well as some
121. Judge Posner faults Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler for offering
no definition of behavioral economics: "JST don't actually tell us what 'behavioral econom-
ics' means. But implicitly -hey define it negatively: It is economics minus the assumption
that people are rational maximizers of their satisfactions." Posner, Rational Choice, supra
note 16, at 1552 (discussingJolls et al., supra note 11). This version of a definition may be
too generous to behavioral economics; as Posner continues, behavioral economics is "an-
titheoretical." Id. Tellingly, however, Posner is almost equally vague in his numerous writ-
ings that only "implicitly" tell us what law and economics means.
122. Schroeder, supra note 20, at 151. I say "seems to have escaped" because I have
found no citations to this claim.
123. Id.
124. Not all doctrinal writing rejects the policymaker perspective. See generally Deborah
L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1327, 1339-40 (2002) (offering a cautious
description and defense of contemporary doctrinal scholarship and noting that it is not
monolithic).
125. Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias and Tort Law, 6 ROGER
WILLIxAMS U. L. Rv. 9, 9-10 (2000).
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other courses, could be taught as consumer law, but in most class-
rooms the instructor and teaching materials will focus on the manu-
facturer.1 26  To the extent consumer law gets taught, argues
Chamallas, the history and politics of American consumer movements
receive little attention. 127 The subsuming of little-guy consumer law
into products liability, with its all-present worry about ex ante effects
on manufacturers and sellers, marks a triumph for law and
economics.
Here, then, we see a piece of what remains in law and economics:
an inclination to address governing entities more than governed indi-
viduals as ends of inquiry in themselves. Desires or resistances of
human beings enter policyrnaking only in the aggregate. While the
critical legal scholar works to "free the legal subject from manipula-
tion by the law,"' 28 the policymaker works to articulate the best
manipulation.
B. Better-Offness
With the policymaker's ascendancy established, a next step asks
what this policymaker should pursue. We have already explored the
search for a word. One reviewer of contemporary law and economics,
undertaking a task like mine here by querying "What is left of the
traditional [law and economics] paradigm?" finesses with a somewhat
evasive answer: "That people are purposively seeking to maximize
something-often (but not always) their own utility, as they appraise
it-and that their purposive efforts are in general well suited to their
ends."129
This tentative vocabulary identifies a goal. While "efficiency,"
"wealth maximization," and "welfare" remain inadequate as
descriptors of what law and economics pursues, there does linger
some slight residue of meaning-something like better-offness-held
in common by each of the inadequate terms. Fairness Versus Welfare, as
was mentioned, moves close to tautology by refusing to exclude much
from "welfare," in order to sell it to observers who would otherwise
prefer to vote for fairness. 130 Kaplow and Shavell's "welfare," though
inane-or, as Kaplow and Shavell prefer to describe their word, "all-
126. Id at 23.
127. Id. at 12-13.
128. Schroeder, supra note 20, at 151.
129. Hill, supra note 84, at 226.
130. See KAPLow & SHAvELL, supra note 18, at 465 (describing "well-being" as conceived
by welfare economics as "all-encompassing (and thus not limited to wealth or other tangi-
ble elements)").
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encompassing" 31-is precise enough to convey a couple of points. By
referring explicitly to welfare economics, this term suggests that poli-
cymaking ought to seek that which can be counted and compared, if
need be at the expense of less precise goals. Similarly, some demur-
rers from Kaplow and Shavell notwithstanding, 13 2 the word has a ma-
terial connotation, implying that certain types of well-being
experienced only as costly mental states (e.g., revenge or retribution,
gratification of sadistic impulses, the pleasures of rape or racism or
the oppression of homosexual persons) ought to carry less weight in
policymaking than more tangible or alienable gains. "Welfare" also
reminds policymakers of scarcity and the need to make tradeoffs, a
goal that individuals asserting rights or entitlements will have a ten-
dency to overlook.
Kaldor-Hicks therefore lives in law and economics: A transfer, or
change, represents an improvement if the "gainers gain more than
the losers lose.' 33 Especially when compared to the robust (if elu-
sive) Pareto alternative for judging welfare, this better-offness crite-
rion is so thin that many critics suspect its raison d'etre must be to
cover "ideological biases." 134 Surely no policymaker could use it to
figure out what to do.'1 5
C. Ex Ante Rather Than Ex Post
A final aspect of law and economics that may (or may not) con-
tain content distinct from the other two is its focus on the future to
the exclusion of the past. In this ex ante perspective, those who makelaw ought to strive to improve welfare not so much by reaching the
right answer in a particular dispute but by writing doctrine that would
foster the goods that law and economics says we all pursue: efficiency,
wealth maximization, welfare, better-offness, or what you will. Focus-ing on ex ante rather than ex post is more legislative than adjudica-
tive, and hence consistent with the policymaker ascendant: A mere
131. Id.
132. Kaplow and Shavell make clear that their notion of "welfare" is "not limited to
wealth or other tangible elements," and they go on to note that "[i]n arguing that no
evaluative importance should be given to notions of fairness, we are criticizing principles[such as corrective justice and retributive justice] that give weight to factors that are inde-
pendent of individuals' well-being or its overall distribution." Id.133. Cooter and Ulen so define the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. COOTER & ULEN, supra note12, at 44. Although this definition is of limited value because it finesses on the crucial
question of measurement, it conveys a general idea of getting better.134. Crespi, Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 103, at 243; see also Markovits, supra note 100, at494-507 (arguing that Kaldor-Hicks is biased in favor of the status quo).
135. Kennedy, Palgrave Essay, supra note 67, at 470.
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litigant, in contrast to an ex ante policymaker, might simply try to win
her own case. The better-offness criterion is also repeated here, as the
ex ante approach to a dispute spreads its effects beyond the parties:
more people, more welfare.
In this posture, law and economics stands against several smaller
antagonists: the "corrective justice" sector, located mainly in tort the-
ory and exemplified by Ernest Weinrib, whose opposition to law and
economics we encountered at the beginning of this Article;'
36 those
who, again in torts, emphasize "compensation" at the expense of "de-
terrence;"1"7 the retribution tradition in criminal law and punish-
ment;1"8 the embrace of Kant within legal theory;
1 3 9 and dissenters
aligned with a critique by Andrew Kull, a scholar of equitable reme-
dies, of the tendency among courts to favor administrative ease over
the attainment of justice between private parties. 4 '
III. WHO'S IN, WHO'S OUT
In a 2000 lecture, Judge Alex Kozinski noted the impact of the
law and economics movement:
Incentives and disincentives, supply and demand, marginal
cost and marginal benefit-all these terms and the concepts
behind them have become the everyday building blocks of
legal arguments. Their impact is felt not merely in areas
such as antitrust, which have a more or less direct relation-
ship to economics, but also in virtually all areas of the law.
4
'
Kozinski sounds quite right. Now what? After this much success,
where does law and economics end and other approaches to the law
begin?
136. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing Weinrib's edifice metaphor).
See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw (1995).
137. See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 AIA. L. REV.
327, 337-38 (2004) (gathering materials on tort policy that appear to deem compensation
more important than deterrence).
138. See Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 n.5 (1952) (discussing retribu-
tion as the historic purpose of the criminal law).
139. See George P. Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 428 (1987) (associating
the rise of Kantian legal theory with a desire "to ground legal principles in solid, non-
utilitarian values").
140. See generally Andrew Kull, The Simplification of Private Law, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 284
(2001).
141. Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 Hous. L. REv. 295, 317
(2000).
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A. Policymaking, Better-Offness, and Ex Ante Outlooks Beyond
the Movement
What little remains of law and economics is now commonplace
among judges and scholars who are emphatically not associated with
this movement. Their writings express all three of the above-men-
tioned remaining law and economics characteristics: an explicit desire
to make policy, an apparent taste for better-offness in a Kaldor-Hicks
sense, and an affinity for ex ante perspectives on the law. Such writing
could be taken as proof that the movement has triumphed: We are all
economic analysts now, perhaps. 142 But neither these writers nor any-
one purporting to speak for the movement seeks to expand its bound-
aries to include them. Hence my contrary position: Law and
economics has disintegrated to the point that its only remaining com-
mitments are too diffusely held to be distinctive. To illustrate the
point, I have gathered a few examples, first from judicial opinions and
then from scholarly writing.
1. What Little Remains, Judicial Division.-Two Supreme Court
Justices who displayed especially little interest in, or connection to,
the law and economics movement while serving on the Court during
its heyday were Thurgood Marshall and Harry Blackmun. Both of
these Justices nevertheless used law and economics watchwords and
tropes in their opinions for the Court. Marshall employed cost-bene-
fit reasoning not only where it was doctrinally required (for instance,
in considering the application of an equitable rule to riparian
rights1 43 ), but also where he did not have to (for instance, in judging a
claim of conscientious objector status when the objector objected only
to the Vietnam War, not to all war' 4 4 ). Blackmun, in an opinion that
disallowed punitive damages against municipalities in § 1983 actions,
expressed concern for the ongoing financial stability of local govern-
ments and made copious use of the ex ante perspective, focusing on
the inability of these damages to deter misconduct. 145 In another de-
cision Blackmun invoked deterrence when refusing to extend the ex-
clusionary rule to exclude evidence in a federal civil proceeding: The
142. See MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, Two LucKY PEOPLE: MEMOIRS 231(1998) (noting the statement "We are all Keynesians now" attributed to Richard Nixon and
to Milton Friedman in 1966).
143. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 189-90 (1982) (listing factors to be con-
sidered in a cost-benefit analysis).
144. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455-60 (1971) (discussing the administra-tive burdens and uncertainty that a flexible rule would create, and the increased costs of
applying such a rule).
145. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263, 268-72 (1981).
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police would not be much deterred by such an exclusionary rule,
Blackman contended, and even if they were, the societal costs of this
deterrence were too high.
1 4 6
Policymaking, better-offness, and ex ante outlooks flourish
among other leading judges who are equally unaffiliated with the
movement. Stephen Reinhardt, who once "famously proclaimed at a
Yale seminar that social science had never affected his judicial deci-
sionmaking,' 14 ' nevertheless has pleaded in print for "numbers that
can be supported by empirical and statistical arguments,"
14 and also
has considered incentive effects on prospective parties.
149 One noted
nonmember of the movement, Jack Weinstein, made his case against
the federal sentencing guidelines in cost-benefit terms,'
° and several
of his sentencing opinions speak about incentives and deterrence.
1 51
Joyce Kennard used similar reasoning to reject intentional spoliation
as a freestanding tort,"5 2 and to adopt strict products liability for man-
ufacturers of component parts.
15 3
2. What Little Remains, Scholarship Division.-Although it is diffi-
cult to identify the legal scholars' division of nonmembers-they do
not sign up in a counterpart to the American Law and Economics
Association-it is easy to find examples of policymaking, better-off-
ness, and ex ante perspectives in work rooted far from law and eco-
nomics. Margaret Jane Radin, a declared antagonist to the
movement, 154 advocates weighing the harms of the death penalty
against incremental gains in deterrence.' 55 Detailing a plan for inno-
vations in low-income housing, Duncan Kennedy works almost en-
tirely in a vocabulary of incentives; 156 his critique of law and
146. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976).
147. Ian Ayres &JohnJ. Donohue III, Shooting Down the "More Guns, Less Crime" Hypothe-
sis, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1193, 1296 (2003).
148. Stephen Reinhardt, Whose Federal Judiciary Is It Anyway, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 6
(1993).
149. Munoz v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991).
150. United States v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. 88, 91-92 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
151. E.g., United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); United States
v. Concepcion, 825 F. Supp. 19, 23-24 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
152. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 520-21 (Cal. 1998).
153. Jimenez v. Superior Court, 58 P.3d 450, 455 (Cal. 2002).
154. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
155. Margaret Jane Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 989, 1029 (1978).
156. See Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop as a Vehicle for Affordable Housing in a
Race and Class Divided Society, 46 How. L.J. 85, 91-95 (2002) (arguing that allowing the
occupants of low income housing to participate in the management provides an incentive
for occupants to invest in their homes).
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economics also relies on precepts shared with the movement. 157 Ron-
ald Dworkin, a frequent sparring partner of Judge Posner, analyzes
the Bakke158 decision in cost-benefit terms. 159 Historian and law and
society pioneer Lawrence Friedman studies the actionability of privacy
under the New York law of consumer protection with reference to
deterrence.160 The critical legal studies movement works extensively
with empirical data.161
B. Toward the Hard-To-Escape Conclusion That Law and Economics Has
Deteriorated into a Faculty Club
For this discussion I start with a leading publication about the
condition of law and economics in the American legal academy. In1989 Robert Ellickson set out to measure the presence of law and eco-
nomics in law schools. 162 He reported stagnation: "In general, law
and economics is no longer growing as a scholarly or curricular force
within the leading American law schools. Instead, it is simply holding
previously won ground."163 Citing the obligation that he, as an eco-
nomic analyst of the positive stripe, had to support his assertions with
facts, Ellickson set out to "provide some evidence" that law and eco-
nomics had plateaued in law schools.' 64
The effort foundered on methodological shoals. 165 When count-
ing the number of articles in law and economics that elite student-
edited journals at Chicago, Harvard, Stanford, and Yale had pub-lished, for instance, Ellickson classified an article as fitting within his
paradigm "if it was both friendly to the economic paradigm and also
157. See Kennedy, Critique, supra note 5; Kennedy, Palgrave Essay, supra note 67.158. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
159. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATI-ER OF PRINCIPLE 296-97 (1985).
160. Lawrence Friedman, Establishing Information Privacy Violations: The New York Experi-
ence, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651, 662-65 (2003). Friedman has also written that "all criminaljustice, whatever else can be said about it, is economic in one crude, primary sense: its rules
are attempts to fix prices or ration behavior." LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISH-
MENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 107 (1993). I thank Dan Cole for telling me about the quota-
tion-a concise way to express Part III.A's contention that if we can stick to a very thin
working definition of "economic," we are almost all economic analysts now.161. Levit, supra note 111, at 286-89. On the complex relationship between critical legal
studies and "empiricism," see David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and
Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984).
162. Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique
of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989) [hereinafter Critique].
163. Id. at 26.
164. Id.
165. Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 57, 57-58 (1989) (criticizing Ellickson's methodology) [hereinafter Comment
on Ellickson].
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made use of, or cited many works in, economics or law and econom-
ics' 1 66-a standard that subsequent researchers could not use in an
attempt to replicate his findings, even assuming (contrary to a criti-
cism from Posner) that Ellickson had looked at the right schools and
journals.1 67 Ellickson also claimed that notable senior scholars, in-
cluding Guido Calabresi, Bruce Ackerman, and Frank Michelman,
had "either abandoned [law and economics] or begun to stress its lim-
itations, '1 6' a claim these scholars might have disputed and one that,
like Ellickson's earlier effort at article-counting, begs the question of
what Ellickson meant when he said law and economics.
Ellickson's agenda, frankly stated in his article, was to encourage
a change in law and economics scholarship in the direction he fa-
vored, and that Posner had long opposed.1 69 The stagnation he saw
implied fatigue, if not malaise. He had a cure at hand: "All this [evi-
dence of the law and economics decline in the legal academy] sug-
gests how a freshening of the law and economics paradigm with ideas
from psychology and sociology would help rejuvenate the specialty
within law schools.
' 170
Now, along with many other readers, I admire much of the post-
Chicago law and economics literature in general and Ellickson's work
in particular. It all ought to flourish. But Ellickson's use of data
shows the nearly infinite manipulability of what can be marshaled to
bolster what anyone wants to say about the state of law and economics
in the legal academy. Ellickson started by not defining law and eco-
nomics. Then he found his evidence by referring to tautology: Law
and economics scholarship means scholarship friendly to law and eco-
nomics or that cites writings in law and economics, he said. Then he
pondered whether to exclude Calabresi and Ackerman and
Michelman from law and economics based on their later writings
(query: Is a paper by a pedigreed author that criticizes this subject
inside the movement, or out?), and decided to infer that recent in-
creases in the representation of Ph.D. economists among those who
publish in law and economics was evidence of decline rather than ex-
166. Ellickson, Critique, supra note 162, at 27.
167. Posner, Comment on Ellickson, supra note 165, at 57.
168. Ellickson, Critique, supra note 162, at 28.
169. See id. at 25 (arguing that law and economics scholars "should increasingly look to
psychology and sociology in order to enrich the explanatory power and normative punch
of economic analysis"); see also Posner, Rational Choice, supra note 16 (criticizing Jolls, Sun-
stein, and Thaler's case for behavioral law and economics).
170. Ellickson, Critique, supra note 162, at 35.
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pansion. 17' And finally, as a tonic to "rejuvenate the specialty" 72 from
a torpor that nobody else had criticized and that had no objective
referents to help measure either the disease or the effect of an anti-
dote, Ellickson prescribed-what else?-a large helping of his particu-
lar research interests.
I summarize Ellickson's argument this way not to attack his plea
for adding psychology, sociology, and "culture" to law and economics,
nor to criticize him for doing bad empirical work, but to suggest that
as soon as law and economics lost its distinctive character (thanks to
too much refutation and too much acceptance), its adherents lost
their basis for dividing the legal academy into members and nonmem-
bers. Nevertheless their inclination to sort people into two piles with-
out transparent criteria for division-the kind of dichotomous sorting
that a Jeanne Schroeder-style "cult"'73 would do-remains. Uncon-
strained by genuine criteria for membership, decisionmakers in the
academy and beyond-to the extent that law and economics extends
beyond law schools-are now free to substitute prejudices for
standards.
The most widely suspected prejudice is of political conservatism.
Consider the possibility that
facile assumptions have been carefully chosen to push for-
ward a politically conservative agenda. Viewed in this light,
the choreography is unsurpassed. First, equate utility with
ability to pay, but assume away the issue of initial wealth dis-
tribution and bargaining inequalities. Next, combine with
the inevitability of common-law efficiency. The result is a
bias away from government regulation toward a nineteenth-
century, almost Lochneresque, laissez-faire conception of the
primacy of private law. The ability of good rhetoric to make
this all appear natural is remarkable.' 74
Before continuing to muse about possible prejudices, I should
emphasize that their existence cannot be proved.1 75 Instead I look at
171. See id. at 32 (worrying that this increased professionalization may "estrange the law
and economics movement from the ordinary law professor").
172. Id. at 35.
173. Schroeder, supra note 20, at 150.
174. Reza Dibadj, Beyond Facile Assumptions and Radical Assertions: A Case for "Critical Legal
Economics," 2003 UTAH L. REv. 1155, 1170 (footnotes omitted).
175. Few even speculate about them in print, although Tom Ulen has recently written
that a perceived "high correlation between one's comfort level with law and economics and
one's comfort level with the policies and personalities of the conservative wing of the Re-publican Party" is "spurious." Thomas S. Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other)
Additions to the Law School and Law and Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 35, 42
(2004).
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the opportunity available within law and economics (that is, the loss
and deterioration of most if not all meaningful movement-defining
content, which would otherwise have constrained members from ca-
pricious exclusions and dismissals) combined with certain outcomes.
In the absence of other explanations for what looks like a particular
sort of prejudice, it may be reasonable to infer a connection between
the freedom to indulge prejudice and results that are consistent with
prejudice and less consistent with the absence of prejudice.
In this light, consider the scant presence of women in law and
economics. (The same generalization holds for racial minorities, but
appears less dramatic because of the underrepresentation of racial mi-
norities in the legal profession and the legal academy, as a whole 76).
According to data for the 2002-03 academic year, more than ninety
percent of those teaching law and economics in American law schools
were male.1 77 Prejudice? (Men may have been more qualified to
teach the course, or more interested in doing so.) A survey of the
nonstudent-authored articles that the main law reviews at Berkeley,
Chicago, Columbia, Duke, Harvard, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Stan-
ford, Virginia, Yale, and UCLA published in 2002 found three hun-
dred percent more law and economics articles than feminist legal
theory articles, 178 while the number of professors teaching women
and the law was twenty-six percent larger than the number who taught
law and economics.1 79 Prejudice? (Manuscripts on law and econom-
ics might have been of higher quality; the study did not look at unpub-
lished manuscripts even to count the number of submissions in both
categories; surely no one would argue for subject-matter quotas in a
law review?) An outside surveyor cannot say that law and economics
lingers as a sector in the legal academy in part for the purpose of
excluding women and keeping women subordinated: one cannot
know for sure. 180
176. See Linz Audain, Critical Cultural Law and Economics, the Culture of Deindividualization,
the Paradox of Blackness, 70 IND. L.J. 709, 748-53 (1995) (discussing the connections between
law and economics and critical race theory).
177. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Why a Duck? Are Feminist Legal Journals an Endangered Spe-
cies, and if So, Are They Worth Saving?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 478, 483 (2003) (citing
unpublished Association of American Law Schools data).
178. Id. at 481.
179. Id. at 482.
180. Cf Nancy E. Dowd, Liberty vs. Equality in Defense of Privileged White Males, 34 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 429, 468 (1993) (reviewing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws (1992)) ("Certainly if one wished to dis-
criminate not merely in spite of, but because of, race and sex, this book would provide an
argument to do so. But I will give Epstein the benefit of the doubt (why, I'm not sure; it's
probably a weakness of feminists).").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Another prejudice, related to the one against women, could be
an undertheorized, or less than conscious, affinity and affection for
persons who hold power. Responding to Frank Easterbrook's study of
economics as it arose in the Supreme Court's 1983 docket, 81 Robin
West has speculated that those who adhere to law and economics ven-
erate the authority that patriarchal figures hold.8 2 Standing serene
against the writings of Freud, these adherents of law and economics
perceive no danger in the power of powerful men. West claims that
law and economics urges the law to encourage the exercise of author-
ity in response to their desires; the powerful must do as they like.18 3
"[M]ight is innocent," according to the law and economics creed:
Our fathers are protecting us, not oppressing us. The revo-
lutionary-federalist-founding father-fourteenth amendment-
Civil Rights Act coalition of fathers has maintained our col-
lective, public identity. Our stronger brothers-those with
superior bargaining power in the private realm-have
desires that serve the community. Father rules us while big
brother increases the size of the pie." 4
A reader need not credit speculations like these (I myself do) in
order to accept my worry that law and economics has deteriorated
into a faculty club.1' 5 Even in the relative shelter of the academy, any
sector that retains power while no longer possessing the central tenets
that once defined it is dangerous. Its lack of foundational content
threatens the movement itself, as well as outsiders vulnerable to the
harms it can inflict through unjustified condemnation and exclusion.
After its hollowing-out, law and economics may or may not be a faculty
club; in any case it lacks the coherence and unified principles it pos-
sessed when The Costs of Accidents was new.
181. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreward: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984).
182. Robin West, Law, Rights, and Other Totemic Illusions: Legal Liberalism and Freud's The-
ory of the Rule of Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 817, 846-47 (1986). See generally Anita Bernstein,
Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles and the Prescription of Masculine Order, 54
VAND. L. REv. 1367 (2001).
183. West, supra note 182, at 852.
184. Id.
185. For the "club" accusation as expressed by a conservative economist, see Daniel B.
Klein, The Ph.D. Circle in Academic Economics, 2 ECONJ. WATCH 133, 146 (2005) (concluding
that "while the top departments attract the most bright-smart students and best train them
in club ways, a very deep concern remains about the club being poisoned by a complacent,
tepid, genteel, governing-set political culture").
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IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE Now?
Writers frequently depict law and economics as an aging giant.
Their metaphors of decline and old age perhaps rush too fast to judg-
ment: In addition to premature proclamations of death, and wishful
thinking that the movement had "peaked," the literature on law and
economics includes a 1991 claim about a "mid-life crisis."'" 6 I have
already fretted about hurrying to entomb law and economics. 187 That
said, this birthday of a great book, marking indeed "a generation of
influence," does invite thought about the state of the movement it
helped inaugurate.
Conceding that dichotomous thinkers within the law and eco-
nomics movement might be inclined to classify the reflections in this
Article as hostile to their cause, I maintain that the Article has de-
picted law and economics as evolving, rather than entirely refuted or
spent. This Article has indeed argued that the core tenets of the
movement are refuted and spent. It has also contended that law and
economics has failed to rescue itself by its tactic of trying to claim for
itself various refutations of these tenets. But my reflections find a par-
adox in law and economics: The movement while deteriorating has
been thriving. It reached heights scaled by no other jurisprudential
school. Its success has consisted mainly of telling lawyers, lawmakers,
and legal scholars how and why they must keep their eye on the wel-
fare ball when making policy-but it has also fostered other triumphs:
the importation of interdisciplinary findings into law and across cam-
puses; the insistence on (if not quite the achievement of) empirical
research as integral to legal policy; and the touch of science-whose
perils and pretensions I have noted but that also can spur lawyers to
reach for more rigorous work.
These victories of law and economics, or so it seems to me any-
way, share a theme of inclusion. Law and economics works best when
it opens, expands, stretches. Its worst tendency is to narrow itself into
a small, crabby in-group, squinting at its ranks and those around it to
refine its criteria for exclusion. In order for the movement to achieve
its best self, members and nonmembers alike need to reread and reaf-
firm the generous manifesto celebrated in this Symposium.
The Costs of Accidents is a book that continually finds common
cause with a large public. It not only links its goal of reducing acci-
dent costs with both fairness and welfare, thereby making room for
186. Crespi, Mid-Life Crisis, supra note 103. Surely law and economics was only in its
thirties that year-a stripling!
187. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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everyone at the table, but it also sees little separation between the two;
Calabresi begins the last part of the book, tided Justice and the Fault
System, with an explicit connection: "None of my criticisms of the fault
system, based as they are on its failure to reduce accident costs ade-
quately, would be decisive if the fault system found substantial support
in our notions of justice." ' The audience invited here is everyone
who cares about the problem of injury to human beings, rather than a
partisan cohort.
No surprise then that Guido Calabresi, more than any other of
the four men whom the American Law and Economics Association
calls founders of the movement,i89 has throughout his long career
reached generously to engage those who care about American law and
policy, paying no heed to club-membership credentials. Guido never
invaded in order to enlarge the turf and boundaries that he built. He
never even stooped to protect these spaces. When his concerns came
together with a larger legal discourse, we readers, lawmakers, scholars,
and the American public were all-in the happy ending that welfare
economics endows-made better off.
188. THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 1, at 291.
189. Along with Coase, Manne, and Posner. See MERCURO & MEDEMA, Supra note 9, at
193 n.I.
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